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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. JURISDICTION CASES INVOLVING BREACH OF A PATENT LICENSE
Crucible Chemical Co. v. Burlington Industries, Inc.1 represents the
South Carolina Supreme Court's first opinion on one of the more difficult
questions of subject-matter jurisdiction-whether the state has jurisdiction over
a particular case involving patents. 2 The Crucible court held that the suit
arose on state contract and tort claims, and therefore, it fell within state court
jurisdiction.
3
The litigation underlying Crucible illustrates the difficulty that may be
encountered in suits involving patents. Crucible, an opinion concerning the
court's jurisdiction only, spanned three years of threshold jurisdictional
litigation, during which both the state and the federal courts denied jurisdic-
tion.4 Such jurisdictional floundering, reminiscent of Christianson v. Colt
Industries Operating Corp. ,' appears frequently in cases involving patents.'
Crucible arose over the breakdown in arrangements between a patent
licensor and its licensee. Crucible Chemical Co. (Crucible) granted an
1. _ S.C. __, 423 S E.2d 121 (1992). The suit was on remand at the time of this writing.
This comment reflects the overall litigation as of Spring 1993.
2. State courts have previously decided cases involving patents, thus impliedly answering the
jurisdictional question. See, e.g., Alarnance Indus. v. Chesterfield Hosiery Mill, 239 S.C. 287,
122 S.E.2d 648 (1961). The court of appeals addressed a similar question involving copyright,
in Maxey v. R.L. Bryan Co., 295 S.C. 334, 368 S.E.2d 466 (Ct. App. 1988) (dismissing
copyright case from state court because the action arose under the United States Copyright Act,
despite a threshold issue of state contract law). Crucible, involving patents, reached a conclusion
opposite from that reached in Maxey. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
3. Crucible, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 124.
4. Following remand by the federal court for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction, the state trial
court dismissed because it found that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at _, 423
S.E.2d at 123.
5. 486 U.S. 800 (1988). Christianson, a former Colt employee, sued for antitrust violations
and for tortious interference with business relations after Colt informed its customers that
Christianson was infringing on Colt's patents. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, which retains exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals shifted the appeal back and forth, each asserting it lacked jurisdiction and that
the other circuit was "clearly wrong" in sending it the case. Id. at 803. The Federal Circuit,
maintaining it lacked jurisdiction, nonetheless finally rendered an opinion "in the interest of
justice." Id. at 807. The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit's opinion for lack of
jurisdiction and remanded with instructions to transfer the appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at
819.
6. Whether a case arises under the patent laws is "one of the darkest corridors of the law of
federal courts and federal jurisdiction." Donald S. Chisum, The Allocation of Jurisdiction
Between State and Federal Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633, 639 (1971)
(footnote omitted).
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exclusive license to Burlington Industries, Inc. (Burlington) to use, improve
upon, and sublicense both patents and trade secrets.7 Crucible filed the suit
in question against Burlington, stating six causes of action8 and seeking $100
million in actual damages plus punitive damages.' Burlington removed the
case to federal court based on the federal court's exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction over cases relating to patents. 0 At the remand hearing, Crucible
stipulated that. it was "not .. asking for any sort of remedy against
[defendant] for the use of patented technology without the appropriate
authorization."" Therefore, the federal district court remanded. 2 Howev-
er, based on an apparent contradiction of that statement by Crucible during
discovery, the state court subsequently denied jurisdiction and dismissed the
case.' 3 Crucible then appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The core of difficulty in Crucible lies within its second cause of action,
in which the plaintiff alleged misappropriation of patents, trade secrets, and
know-how.14 Patent infringement, a federal tort, involves the unauthorized
use, selling, or making of a patent during the lifetime of the patent.'" It is
described as "a trespass on the property rights of the patentee"' 6 and the
appropriation of the essential elements of the invention.'" In addition to
7. Crucible, _ S.C. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 121-22. The full text of the Agreement appears
in the Record at 42-73. Although the case involves secondary plaintiffs and defendants, as well
as a secondary licensing agreement, this comment will focus on the main actors.
8. Crucible, __ S.C. at __, 423 S.E.2d at 122. The six causes of action included the
following: breach of the licensing agreement, misappropriation and conversion of the patented
technology, civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair trade practices. The
plaintiff later added a negligence claim as well. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 122.
9. Record at 32-36.
10. Crucible, _ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 122. The federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988).
Defendants could only remove based on federal questionjurisdictionbecause the additional parties
destroyed diversity as a ground for jurisdiction. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Remand
at 3 n.1 (Nov. 8, 1989).
11. Crucible, __ S.C. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Hearing Transcript at 11 (Nov.
1, 1989)).
12. Id. at_, 423 S.E.2d at 123.
13. Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 123. Although admitting it did not intend to plead an action for
infringement, Crucible claimed that it "specifically [is] seeking a remedy against Burlington for
the unauthorized use and appropriation of patented technology through breach of the Licensing
Agreement." Id. at _, 423 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Amended Answers to Defendant's Request
for Admissions at 1-2).
14. Record at 32-33. Note that although both plaintiff and defendant refer to "Crucible
technology" as involving patents, the licensing agreement defined the term to include trade secrets
and know-how, carefully distinguishing between it and "Crucible patent rights." Id. at 45.
15. 69 C.J.S. Patents § 282 (1951).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 290(a).
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federal intellectual property actions, state actions may lie for misappropriation
of intellectual property, such as trade secrets and know-how.' 8 However,
states may not provide remedies for patent infringement. 19 Furthermore,
federal law will likely preempt any claim, such as misappropriation or
conversion, that approximates infringement."
State courts can and do apply federal patent law and make binding
adjudications on patent questions in a variety of situations.2 State courts
may decide not only patent questions which arise by way of defense, ' but
18. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (finding Ohio trade
secret law not preempted by federal patent laws).
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution grants to the Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries .... "
In the 1972 Term, in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), we held that the
cl. 8 grant of power to Congress was not exclusive ....
... The only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by
Congress ....
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 478-79. The Court rephrased the inquiry as being "whether and
under what circumstances [state law] might constitute 'too great an encroachment on the federal
patent system to be tolerated.'" Id. at 482 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 232 (1964)).
The misappropriation doctrine exists to cover torts which fall outside traditional trademark,
copyright, patent, and trade secret protections. The action is usually pleaded with the elements
of substantial investment by the plaintiff, misappropriation and use by the defendant, and damage.
Misappropriation does not include the use of information gained through privity of contract.
Independent derivation is allowable in the misappropriation context, while not allowable in the
patent context. Also, the tort requires that the misappropriated property be used in competition
with the plaintiff. C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation
Doctrine: Common Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 67-72
(1987).
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted an injunction against acts alleged to be
misappropriation and unfair trade practices in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Custom
Recording Co., 258 S.C. 465, 189 S.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) (granting federal courts exclusive jurisdiction).
20. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (patent and copyright
infringement); Miracle Boot Puller Co. v. Plastray Corp., 269 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (conversion of patent rights). See generally, Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road
Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright Disputes, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 703, 712 (1988) (discussing resolution of suits involving patents, copyrights, and
trademarks in state courts). A full discussion of preemption or misappropriation is beyond the
scope of this comment.
21. See generally Chisum, supra note 6, at 633; Edward H. Cooper, State Law of Patent
Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REv. 313 (1972); Lee & Livingston, supra note 20, at 703.
22. E.g., Pratt v. Paris GCs Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897) (finding that assertion
of an invalid patent as a defense does not oust the state court of jurisdiction); see also Lee &
Livingston, supra note 20, at 720 (discussing state courts' adjudication of defenses asserting
3
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also a number of other patent questions, including matters of scope, validity,
ownership, and even infringement.' Whether a particular action in the suit
arises under federal patent law governs the issue of jurisdiction.
A suit arises under the patent law (as any suit arises under federal law)
only when the well-pleaded complaint demonstrates that federal law creates the
action or is a necessary element of the action.24 For example, a breach of
contract, whether or not it involves patents, is a state claim.' Patent law
questions arising from the defense or anticipatory defenses to the contract
action are insufficient to support federal jurisdiction. 6 Moreover, the
question is one of substance: If the complaint makes out a case for infringe-
ment, the case arises under federal law, whether or not the plaintiff uses the
word "infringement." 27 Similarly, a complaint might involve infringement
or patent law, but if a construction of that law is not necessary to one of the
claims, then no federal jurisdiction exists.2" A possible exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule turns on a court's finding that the complaint as
amended includes a new cause of action under federal law. Under Rule 15(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 9 a judge may deem the amended
pleadings to include any cause of action which is tried by consent of the
parties.30
One factor which further complicates the jurisdictional question in cases
involving patents is the existence of the pleader's choice. The Pleader's
Choice Doctrine allows a plaintiff to choose whether to sue for breach of
contract or for infringement.31 An understanding of the meaning of Pleader's
Choice, as well as the consequences of a court's characterization of the
complaint, is important. The plaintiffs option is one of law, not of forum,
regardless of the fact that choice of law determines the forum.32 The
noninfringement, invalidity, and misuse of patents).
23. Pratt, 168 U.S. at 259-61; see infra note 26 and accompanying text.
24. E.g., Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
25. See, e.g., Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1883).
26. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983), superseded by statute as stated in e.g., Department of
Revenue v. Investment Fin. Management Co., 831 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1987)).
27. E.g., Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809-10 n.3 (citing Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 22).
28. Id. at 809-10.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b). South Carolina's rule mirrors the federal rule. See S.C. R. Civ.
P. 15(b).
30. The Christianson Court held that no consent existed to try a federal question, and
therefore refused to set a standard for creating jurisdiction under Rule 15(b). 486 U.S. at 814-
15. However, the Court recognized that "the district court's jurisdiction is determined by
reference to the well-pleaded complaint, not the well-tried case." Id. at 814.
31. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); see also Chisum,
supra note 6, at 646 (discussing the Pleader's Choice Doctrine and the plaintiff's choice of
forum).
32. In The Fair, Justice Holmes stated that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide
[Vol. 45
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plaintiff's choice of law appears most clearly in disputes following the
licensing of patents.33
A patent, as intellectual property, carries with it an absolute right to keep
others from using the patented property without permission. 4 The protection
goes beyond actually copying or stealing the patent-holder's method; it
includes the right to stop another from using the method, even if that person
developed it independently (as long as the plaintiff holds a valid patent on that
method).3" If a licensing agreement precedes an infringement, then the
plaintiff may choose the recourse and law under which he or she will seek
recovery. The plaintiff may sue either in state court for breach of the
licensing agreement or in federal court for patent infringement.36 However,
federal courts regularly apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel to later suits for infringement and other matters actually litigated in
state court.37 Thus, a counterclaim alleging invalidity or noninfringement in
what law he will rely upon." 228 U.S. at 25. Justice Holmes further recognized that "if it should
appear that the plaintiff was not really relying upon the patent law for his alleged rights, or if the
claim of right were frivolous, the case might be dismissed." Id. Justice Holmes muddied the
doctrine in a later case by stating that "the plaintiff is absolute master of what jurisdiction he will
appeal to; and if he goes to the District Court for infringement of a patent, unless the claim is
frivolous or a pretence, the District Court will have jurisdiction on that ground." Healy v. Sea
Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479, 480 (1915) (citing Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific
Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282 (1902)).
The plaintiff's choice lies in which of the two claims is alleged, rather than the jurisdiction
chosen or type of relief requested. The plaintiff's claim (e.g., infringement or breach of contract)
determines the jurisdictional forum. However, a plaintiff may not avoid the federal court by
pleading a state cause of action and failing to plead an obvious federal question. Deats v. Joseph
Swantak, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 973 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.) (citing Franchise Tax Bd. v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 (1983), superseded by statute as stated
in e.g., Department of Revenue v. Investment Fin. Management Co., 831 F.2d 790 (8th Cir.
1987)). In Deats the plaintiff filed in state court alleging inter alia breach of a patent royalty
agreement, and the defendants removed the case to federal court. In rejecting plaintiff's argument
that removal was improper, the court held that pleading only state law causes of action did not
change the fact that plaintiffs complaint essentially alleged a claim for patent infringement, and
therefore, required an application of patent law. The case thus arose under federal law and could
only be adjudicated in federal court. Having chosen his claim, the plaintiff could not choose an
inconsistent jurisdiction. Id. at 980-82.
33. Cooper, supra note 21, at 326.
34. Id. at 345 (citing Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 36
(1923)).
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
36. Chisum, supra note 6, at 646.
37. For an excellent discussion of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel as
applied by federal courts to matters decided in state courts, see Vanderveerv. Erie MalleableIron
Co., 238 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
1993]
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state court renders a subsequent suit in federal court for infringement barred
by collateral estoppel. 8
Authorities hesitate to state or fimply that a breach of a patent licensing
agreement gives rise to both a state and a federal action, from which the
plaintiff may choose the more desirable course.39 This is not accurate.
While a breach of a licensing agreement accompanied by a patent infringement
leads to true pleader's choice, not all breaches of agreements revoke the
license.40 Some breaches could revoke the license, but that fact may not
confer federal jurisdiction unless the plaintiff complains sufficiently. A fact
pattern may or may not invoke federal jurisdiction simply on the artfulness of
the pleading.4'
Although the case law remains far from settled (or, arguably, consistent),
several themes recur in determining whether or not a pleading states a case for
infringement. If a pleading alleges that the licensee exceeded the scope of its
license, that is usually sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction and grant
pleader's choice because exceeding the scope of the license constitutes a
breach of the contract, and the unauthorized use of the patent constitutes
infringement.42 However, if the pleader alleges that the licensee failed to
perform an affirmative duty under the license, the jurisdictional issue becomes
"murkier."43 The underlying motif is that a breach of contract does not, by
itself, lead to unauthorized use. Courts will deem a suit for nonpayment of
royalties a state contract claim, rather than an infringement claim.
44
Courts will find authorization to use the patent even though a breach of
the contract occurred.4' The plaintiff must show that he or she removed the
authorization to use the patent following the breach, and that the defendant
subsequently continued to use the patent, before infringement comes into
being.
46
38. Cooper, supra note 21, at 322 (citing Vanderveer, 238 F.2d 510).
39. E.g., Chisum, supra note 6, at 646.
40. Cooper, supra note 21, at 328.
41. Id. at 327-28; see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
42. Cooper, supra note 21, at 326 & n.44.
43. Id. at 326-27.
44. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502 (1926), superseded in part by FED. R.
Civ. P. 18(a); Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613, 618 (1883); infra notes 48, 50-52; see also
Cooper, supra note 21, at 327 (suit for failure to make stipulated payments does not "arise
under" federal patent law). But cf. Chisum, supra note 6, at 658-59 (indicating that a plaintiff
may recover for unpaid royalties in state court under breach of contract or in federal court under
infringement).
45. E.g., Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 510 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1975)
(pleading the existence of a license, without pleading termination of the license, necessarily shows
no infringement occurred).
46. See id.; Luckett, 270 U.S. at 504 (citing Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99
(1850), superseded in part by FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a)).
[Vol. 45
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Furthermore, jurisdiction turns on the way in which (or whether) the
pleader alleges rescission of the license. An advantage favoring federal
jurisdiction is that the license authorizes automatic rescission of the contract
and reversion of all rights back to the licensor upon breach.47 Yet even this
type of agreement is not dispositive-the pleader must allege termination of the
license, not merely facts which caused the termination.4" Thus, if the
plaintiff requests the federal court to find that breach of a license occurred,
necessarily causing an infringement, the court will refuse jurisdiction because
the threshold question of breach arises under state law.49 As the court stated
in Arvin: "Federal jurisdiction does not exist, however, when the plaintiff
alleges the existence of a license and asks the court both to declare the license
forfeited and to grant relief for infringement upon the forfeiture being
declared. "5 0
In Crucible"' the plaintiff alleged a breach of the license agreement by
failure to pay royalties and perform other affirmative duties.52 This allega-
tion clearly states a breach of contract action, not infringement. 3 Crucible
also sought damages for the unlawful misappropriation and conversion of the
patents.54 The second claim entailed an allegation of infringement and sought
damages;55 however, the allegation seemed insufficient to confer federal
jurisdiction. The complaint failed to indicate any revocation of the license.
As in Arvin, the complaint demonstrates permission to use the patents and a
failure to abide by a contract agreement, but it never alleged that the license
was affirmatively terminated. Moreover, the licensing agreement did not
contain an automatic reverter clause. 6 To confer federal jurisdiction based
47. See Cooper, supra note 21, at 328.
48. E.g., Luckett, 270 U.S. at 511.
49. E.g., id. at 510-11. But cf. Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983)
(copyright infringement case). The Topolos court held that construing a contract as a threshold
to copyright infringement did not defeat federal jurisdictionbecause Topolos's claim arose "under
the Copyright Act within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)." Id. at 992. Although not a
patent case and contrary to United States Supreme Court patent precedent, Topolos remains
persuasive because of its reliance on § 1338(a), which also confers exclusive jurisdiction on
federal courts over cases arising under federal patent law.
50. Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 510 F.2d 1070, 1073. "If... the patentee
complainant had based his action on his patent right and had sued for infringement, and by
anticipation of a defense of the assignment had allegedaforfeiture by his own declaration without
seeking aid of the court, jurisdiction under the patent laws would have attached." Id. (quoting
Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 511) (emphasis added).
51. Crucible Chem. Co. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., _ S.C. , 423 S.E.2d 121 (1992).
52. Record at 32-33.
53. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
54. Record at 33.
55. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
56. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
1993]
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on the second claim would require the court to deem the license
terminated-something federal courts have repeatedly declined to do.57
However, the complaint's failure to allege revocation of the license did
not necessarily cause the second cause of action to become a claim for which
the state court may give relief. Patent law exists to provide relief for unlawful
use or .making of a patent, and only patent law may afford such relief.58
Thus, the plaintiffs second cause of action for misappropriation and
conversion appears either denied or preempted by federal law.59 The Luckett
Court stated that "when the patentee exercises his choice and bases his action
on the contract and seeks remedies thereunder, he may not give the case a
double aspect, so to speak, and make it a patent case." 6' Although the
Luckett Court spoke of a refusal to find jurisdiction predicated on its
construction of the contract,6' the same rationale applies for damages. The
essence of pleader's choice, after all, centers around a choice-either relief for
breach of contract or relief for unlawful use or making of a patent.
James A. Patrick, III
57. See supra notes 48, 50-52.
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988); see also 69 C.J.S. Patents § 282 (defining and discussing
patent infringement).
59. This argument applies with regard to unlawful making and use of patents. However, one
could view the allegation as an action for misappropriation of know-how and trade secrets, with
patent infringement only an incidental part. Two factors weigh against this interpretation. First,
the licensing agreement primarily addressed the patented processes, with trade secrets and know-
how secondary to the purpose and scope of the license. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
Secondly, the facts do not fit the usual action for misappropriation of intellectual property because
the defendant gained the secrets pursuant to contract and did not use them in direct competition
with the plaintiff. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
60. Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 511 (1926).
61. See id.
[Vol. 45
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